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Blockchain technology has found applications for myriad use cases. A blockchain is an append-only, secure, transparent, distributed
ledger. To implement a blockchain, we need a blockchain protocol for all the nodes to follow. To design a blockchain protocol, we need
a block publisher selection mechanism and a chain selection rule. In Proof-of-Stake based blockchain protocols, block publisher selection
mechanism selects the node to publish the next block based on the relative stake held by the node. PoS protocols are attracting
attention due to their energy efficiency, which is in contrast to the protocol underlying Bitcoin, the most successful peer-to-peer
cryptocurrency blockchain. However, PoS-based blockchain protocols may face vulnerability to fully adaptive corruptions. In literature,
researchers address this issue at the cost of performance.
In this paper, we propose a novel PoS-based blockchain protocol, QuickSync, to achieve security against fully adaptive corruptions
without compromising on performance. We propose a metric called block power, a value defined for each block, derived from the
output of the verifiable random function based on the digital signature of the block publisher. With this metric, we compute chain
power, the sum of block powers of all the blocks comprising the chain, for all the valid chains. These metrics are a function of the
block publisher’s stake to enable the PoS aspect of the protocol. The chain selection rule selects the chain with the highest chain
power as the one to extend. This chain selection rule hence determines the selected block publisher of the previous block. When we use
metrics to define the chain selection rule, it may lead to vulnerabilities against Sybil attacks. QuickSync uses a Sybil attack resistant
function implemented using histogram matching. We prove that QuickSync satisfies common prefix, chain growth, and chain quality
properties and hence it is secure. We also show that it is resilient to different types of adversarial attack strategies, including Sybil
attack. Our analysis demonstrates that QuickSync performs better than Bitcoin by an order of magnitude on both transactions per
second and time to finality, and better than Ouroboros v1 by a factor of three on time to finality.
1 INTRODUCTION
A blockchain is an append-only, secure, transparent, distributed ledger. It stores the data in blocks connected through
immutable cryptographic links, with each block extending exactly one previous block. Introduced in Bitcoin [36],
blockchain is one of the most significant technological innovations of this century. Blockchains have been rigorously
studied and applied to a myriad of use cases that involve establishing distributed trust. The underlying technical problem
that Bitcoin solves through blockchain is byzantine fault tolerant distributed consensus in a decentralized system.
We expect a blockchain to consist of a singular chain of blocks. However, delays in communication and adversarial
attacks may cause forks, creating ambiguity as to extend which block. To avoid forks, we require that only one node
publish a block at a time. Thus, we need a distributed mechanism, which we refer to as block publisher selection mechanism
(BPSM) to select a node as selected block publisher (SBP). To resolve forks, in case they occur, we require the protocol to
specify a chain selection rule (CSR). The BPSM and CSR, functionally characterize a blockchain protocol. Nodes are
incentivized by reward schemes to participate and follow the protocol.
Bitcoin blockchain protocol uses a Proof-of-Work (PoW) based BPSM, and longest chain as the CSR. In the PoW
mechanism, each node has a different cryptographic puzzle to solve, of the same level of difficulty. Once a node solves
the puzzle, it publishes the block, i.e., proposes the block to be added to the chain. The rest of the nodes verify and add
the first valid block they receive to their blockchain.
Bitcoin, though a great innovation, has certain challenges when it comes to efficiency and performance. Bitcoin
consumes a high amount of electrical power to function. As of writing this paper, the Bitcoin network uses an estimated
112 × 103 Peta hashes per second and annual power consumption of 75 TWh [4]. A blockchain’s performance can be
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measured by two metrics: i) transactions per second (tps), and ii) time for finality (tf ), i.e., the time required to confirm
a transaction. Typically in Bitcoin tps = 4 and tf = 60 minutes [5]. Due to the poor tps , it is unable to scale to high
volumes, and the high tf deters usability and adoption. Attempts such as GHOST [40] aim to improve the performance,
by using a different CSR. The BPSM being still PoW-based, its power consumption remains high. Towards addressing
high power consumption, researchers proposed Proof-of-Stake (PoS) based BPSM.
PoS based blockchain protocols, such as Algorand [23] and Casper [11], stochastically select an SBP with probability
proportional to its relative stake. This approach is also consistent with the expectation that nodes that are stakeholders
would not want to endanger the system. The Ouroboros protocols [8, 16, 26, 28] are popular PoS-based protocols,
amongst others. Ouroboros is not only academically published1 in a peer-reviewed forum, but also is the foundation for
the crypto-currency Cardano [13].
Ouroboros v1 (v1) [28] achieves high tps and better tf than Bitcoin. However, for a blockchain protocol to be
completely secure, it must be immune to fully adaptive corruptions (FACs), i.e., a dynamic adversary. Ouroboros v1 is not
immune to FACs. Ouroboros Praos (Praos) [16] uses a different BPSM. Praos did solve the security flaw, but, as we show
in our analysis (Section 8.3), it does so at a high cost to the tps and tf . While both Ouroboros Genesis [8] and Ouroboros
Crypsinous [26] protocols enhance the Ouroboros protocol, they do not improve performance.
In this work, we propose a novel blockchain protocol, QuickSync that is secure against FACs, and achieves slightly
better tps , and improves on the tf by a factor of 3, as compared to Ouroboros v1, the best performing amongst Ouroboros
family of protocols. Essentially, it quickly synchronizes (resolves) the forks that arise. To build QuickSync, we employ
the framework of the Ouroboros protocol. QuickSync differs from v1 and Praos, in both, the BPSM and the CSR. The
key idea is, we propose a metric called block power, assigned to each block. With this, we compute chain power of an
every competing chain. The chain power of a chain is the sum of block powers of all the blocks of the chain. Using
chain powers, we establish the best chain, the one with the highest value for this metric, that the node must build on
from a given set of chains. It results in ensuring that all forks are trivially resolved, except for the ones generated by
the adversary. Block power is a function of the output of the node’s privately computed Verifiable Random Function
(VRF) output based on the digital signature of the node, seed randomness, and the slot counter. The VRF output is not
revealed until the block is published, thus enabling immunity against fully adaptive corruptions. Block power is also a
function of the relative stake that the node holds, to enable the PoS aspect of the mechanism. A naive implementation
of such a concept is vulnerable to Sybil attacks. To solve this, we present a Sybil attack resistant function, which we
utilize for the block power metric, with the help of a technique called histogram matching.
As multiple nodes publish blocks at the same time, it may seem that there will be several forks in QuickSync, as is
the case in the other PoS protocols such as Praos. The key novelty here is that we resolve these forks immediately
using block power rather than relying on the network to eventually resolve them using the longest chain CSR. Thus,
QuickSync is in sharp contrast to other PoS-based mechanisms that do not differentiate between the published blocks.
Researchers showed that any blockchain protocol satisfying the three properties: common-prefix, chain-growth, and
chain-quality implements a robust transaction ledger [20, 27, 37]. First, we prove that QuickSync satisfies these three
properties (Theorem 4). Next, we ascertain that our protocol is immune to FACs (Proposition 2). We also examine our
protocol for different attack strategies and show resistance to them. In summary, the PoS-based blockchain protocol,
QuickSync fixes the security flaw of Ouroboros v1 and performs better in terms of tps and tf by about an order of
magnitude as compared to Bitcoin.
1Some of PoS protocols are not academically published, e.g., Casper
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the related work in this domain. In Section
3, we explain the relevant preliminaries. In Section 4, we describe our protocol, QuickSync, and then analyze its security
in the following section. Following a comparative note in Section 6, we conclude the paper in Section 7. In Appendix,
we provide an analysis of the Ouroboros protocols, discuss the intuition behind QuickSync, analyze the effectiveness of
attack strategies against QuickSync, and finally, discuss how to set the parameters for QuickSync.
2 RELATEDWORK
Bitcoin Protocol. Bitcoin’s popularity has attracted much research on this subject. Analysis of the functioning of
the Bitcoin protocol, in [20, 37], provides a fundamental understanding of how it implements a robust transaction
ledger, while a study of Bitcoin from a game-theoretic perspective, such as in [31, 34], provides insight into the realistic
operation. The vulnerabilities of the protocol are well explored in works such as [7, 14, 19, 44]. There have been several
efforts to improve the Bitcoin protocol, such as the one discussed in [40]. There is also much research based on utilizing
blockchain technology for different purposes, as discussed in [18, 35, 42].
PoS-based Protocols. As pointed out in Introduction, to maintain Bitcoin, the nodes consume a large amount of
power due to PoW-based BPSM. To avoid this massive power consumption, researchers explored alternative modes
of mining currencies. PoS has been one of the most popular such modes. There have been several approaches to
PoS-based protocols apart from the Ouroboros protocol, such as; PPcoin [29], that uses coin age along with PoS and
PoW; Ethereum’s Casper protocol [11], that uses validators that lose their stake when they behave maliciously; Snow
White protocol [10], that too uses epochs and is provably secure; Algorand protocol [23], that uses Byzantine Fault
Tolerant mechanisms to achieve consensus and is also provably secure, though it requires 23 majority of honest nodes.
Apart from independent protocols, there has been significant research on concepts that could potentially improve or
augment PoS protocols. Ouroboros Crypsinous [26] already utilizes one such technology, Zerocash [38], to provide
privacy. PoS protocols could also use context-sensitive transactions [32, 33] as discussed in [21] to do without moving
checkpoints. Efforts such as Scalable Bias-Resistant Distributed Randomness [41], could aid in improving the randomness
beacons used in PoS protocols. Concepts such as, sharding as demonstrated in Omni-Ledger [30], and Proof-of-Stake
Sidechains [22], could potentially be applied to scale the throughput of blockchains.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss the preliminary notions and key concepts required to appreciate QuickSync.
3.1 General Concepts and Notation
In this subsection, we describe the concepts and notation useful for the rest of the paper. We begin by discussing
concepts of PoS blockchain protocols, and then we introduce the framework of the Ouroboros Protocols, and finally, we
describe relative finality and performance metrics.
QuickSync is a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol. This is to say that the execution of the protocol does not rely on
energy-consuming computation to determine the influence of a node (as is the case in Bitcoin), but instead, each node
has influence proportional to the amount of relative stake it holds. This influence is expressed as the probability of being
selected, as the node that extends the blockchain, i.e., as the selected block publisher (SBP). The SBP is determined by
the block publisher selection mechanism (BPSM). The nodes determine which chain to extend using the chain selection
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rule (CSR). Both the BPSM and the CSR are specified by the blockchain protocol. For example, in Bitcoin, the BPSM
used is PoW (whoever solves the cryptographic puzzle first), and the CSR used is longest chain.
In PoS protocols, a node is a stakeholder, that participates in the execution of the protocol. Each node is identified by
a public key pk and holds a master secret keymsk . S is the set of all nodes, composed of H, the set of all honest nodes
(motivated by reward schemes) and, A, the adversary.
A blockchain is a singular sequence of blocks connected by hash links, with each block linked to the last, starting
from the genesis block. The genesis block enlists the initialization specifics and parameters of the blockchain. A block is
comprised of a block header and block data. The block header contains, amongst other things, the publisher’s public
key and the hash of the merkle tree root of the block data, as well as the hash of the previous block. The block data
contains the transactions or any other data that is to be added to the record. block publisher is the node that has built
the block in consideration. We refer to the number of transactions per block as tpb. A chain of blocks, C referred to as
chain, consists of an ordered set of blocks, where every block, Bl ; l > 0 is immutably linked to the block, Bl−1, ∀Bl ∈ C ;
where l represents the ordinal number and B0 is the genesis block. The length of a chain, C , is denoted as len(C), is the
number of blocks in the chain excluding the genesis block. We say that the chain selected by the CSR has been adopted
and is held by the node.
The fraction of the total stake held by the nodes in consideration is referred to as relative stake. rh and ra denotes the
relative stake of the honest nodes and the adversary respectively (rh , ra ≥ 0, rh + ra = 1). The relative stake that is
active and participates in the execution of the protocol at any given moment is represented as ractive ≥ 0.
A fork in a blockchain is the case when two different blocks extend the same block. Forks happen when two or
more honest nodes publish blocks in temporal vicinity, close enough, to not have heard of the other’s blocks (due to
network delay). Forks cause multiple possible valid blocks that can be extended. The adversary could also attempt to
create a fork, privately or publicly, to compromise the protocol intentionally. These forks enable an adversary to double
spend. An essential part of blockchain protocols is to ensure that these forks are resolved with increasing (preferably
exponential) probability as the protocol executes, thus enabling relative finality with time.
Histogram matching is a technique by which, the domain of a function is re-mapped such that its cumulative
distribution function (cdf ), Fi , matches a target cdf, Ft . To do this, for each value, vt , in the domain of Ft , we find a
value, vi , in the domain of Fi , such that Fi (vi ) = Ft (vt ). Using this we find the function, Fhm (vi ) = vt , and apply it to
all vi . For details please refer to [6].
Framework of The Ouroboros Protocol. We now briefly describe the functionalities used in the Ouroboros protocols.
We use these functionalities along with our novel block power driven BPSM and CSR to achieve drastically better
results. To focus on the novelty and avoid redundancy, we do not discuss the details, nuances, and implementations of
these functionalities, which are well presented in the Ouroboros protocol papers.
The Ouroboros framework executes the protocol in a sequence of time periods called epochs that are further
divided into slots, using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) (Also used by Algorand). Each epoch contains a predefined
number of slots. Each slot is of a predefined length, tsl (tsl > 0). The slot number, l , (counted from the start of the
blockchain execution, with the slot corresponding to the genesis block being slot l = 0), uniquely identifies a slot,
as well as the epoch ep that the slot l is a part of. At the start of each epoch, ep, there is a pseudo-genesis block,
B
ep
PG = {seedep , {{pk0, r
ep
0 }, {pk1, r
ep
1 }, . . .}}. It enlists the stake distribution, {{pk0, r
ep
0 }, {pk1, r
ep
1 }, . . .}, of all the
stakeholders, as well as the seed randomness, seedep , that is used to determine the SBP in this epoch, ep. The stake
distribution of the stakeholders is as per the last block of the second last epoch, i.e., ep − 2. The seed randomness, is
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Fig. 1. Epochs and Slots in Ouroboros Fig. 2. The Network N
a result of a multiparty computation, private verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) [39] (although in practice Cardano uses
SCRAPE: SCalable Randomness Attested by Public Entities [15]). This seed randomness is based on the input of the SBP
of the previous epoch, i.e., ep − 1.
This framework of epochs, slots, and pseudo-genesis blocks helps in restricting the power of the adversary. The
adversary should not know the resulting random seed while it can influence it. If this is not the case, the adversary can
always simulate the most favorable way to influence the random seed. Also, the adversary should not be able to change
its stake distribution amongst its nodes, after observing the random seed. If this is not the case, then the adversary can
distribute its stake optimally based on the random seed to yield maximum effectiveness out of the BPSM.
We use forward secure key signatures [9, 16, 24], as in Praos. Forward secure key signatures, in essence, use a public
key, pki , and master secret key,mski , pair for each node i . This pki does not change. Themski is used to generate a
temporary secret key skli (starting from l = 0), which can verifiably be used only for slot l by node i , after which sk
l+1
i
is generated and skli is irrecoverably destroyed. Forward secure key signatures prevent the adversary from corrupting
an honest node to re-publish a block in its favor after the honest node has published a block in a particular slot. In this
attack, the adversary will know exactly which nodes to corrupt, as they would have already published a block with a
certain block power in a certain slot, thus making it public knowledge that they can achieve that block power in that
slot.
To stochastically select block publishers, Ouroboros uses digital signatures to obtain Verifiable Random Function (VRF).
The VRF, {σ i,l,seedepuro ,σ i,l,seed
ep
proof } ← VRF (skli , l , seedep ), takes as input, the secret key of the node i corresponding
to slot l , the current slot number l , and the seed randomness of epoch, ep; it produces, σ i,l,seed
ep
uro , the uniform
random output, of length κ in bits, and σ i,l,seed
ep
proof , the proof. Any entity can verify the legitimacy of σ
i,l,seedep
uro , using
VRFV ERI FY (σ i,l,seed
ep
uro ,σ
i,l,seedep
proof ,pki , l , seed
ep ). Please note, the result of a digital signature can be treated as a
non-ideal VRF. However, to avoid manipulation of the probability of selection through BPSM, an ideal-VRF is required.
This is achieved using the 2-Hash-DH [25] construction, as presented in Praos.
Finally, in QuickSync, as in v1 and Praos, moving checkpoints are used to prevent long-range attacks such as stake-
bleeding attacks [21]. Moving checkpoints, are states of the blockchain, appropriately far enough into the history, such
that no honest nodes would disagree with them. These moving checkpoints are assumed to be reliably and convincingly
communicated to all the honest nodes joining the execution of the protocol (or any other node that has not witnessed
the evolution of the honestly maintained public blockchain to establish the checkpoint for itself).
Relative Finality. To establish relative finality, we define k-finality (referred to as finality) as the property of a
blockchain protocol. We say the protocol has finality with parameter k , if all the honest nodes can confirm a block
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B, once k valid blocks have extended the chain after block B. Similar to Bitcoin and Ouroboros, we establish relative
finality, i.e., the confirmation of a block by an honest node implies that with probability 1 − η (0 < η < 1) no other
honest node will ever in the future disagree with the confirmed block’s placement in the ledger.
To violate k-finality, the adversary must show a chain, C ′, that makes the honest nodes replace their CSR selected
chain, C , where C and C ′ differ by at least k blocks.
Performance metrics. We define transactions per second (tps) of a protocol, as the maximum number of transactions
that the protocol can add to its record every second. We define time to finality (tf ) as the time it takes for the protocol to
confirm a block once published, given a certain required assurance level of 1 − η, 0 < η < 1. Please note that tf = k · tsl ,
where k is the common prefix parameter and tsl is the slot length in units of time.
We summarize these concepts and notation in Table 3.
3.2 Communication Network
• We consider a network, N , of honest nodes H, having rh ≥ 1/2 of the total relative stake.2
• The maximum communication delay (block propagation delay) between any two nodes is at most τ . In QuickSync,
tsl is set equal to τ . This implies synchronous communication amongst the nodes in N , w.r.t. time slots. Note, that
this is exactly the same synchronous communication requirement as in v1, Praos and Algorand (Refer to Section
6 for further details).
• All nodes not in N , are considered to be adversarial who represent ra relative stake.
• Thus, the adversary, A, can be said to be comprised of nodes with malicious intent, Aa , and nodes that follow
the protocol but are not in N due to their high communication delay, Ah . The network is described in Fig. 2.
In the next subsection, we explain our adversarial model.
3.3 The Adversary
We use a dynamic (mobile [43]) byzantine adversarial model (which in terms of ability, due to its dynamic nature, is
more powerful than the one considered in v1, and the same as the ones in Praos and Algorand). The dynamic nature of
the adversary is what enables fully adaptive corruptions (FACs). FAC is the ability of the adversary to corrupt any node
instantaneously. FACs threaten the security of the protocol when the adversary can know that corrupting a certain
portion of the relative stake is better than corrupting another portion of the relative stake (of the same size). The
adversary, however, is always bound by rh ≥ 1/2.
In favor of the adversary, we assume that Ah is also a part of the adversary, as well as Aa . Thus, we define the
adversary, A, as A = S \ H. In our model, any a ∈ A can:
• read all communication between all nodes instantly.
• show any chain, that it is aware of, to any honest node.
• corrupt any node (turn any honest node into an adversarial node) at any given moment provided rh ≥ 1/2.
• freely, privately, and instantly communicate amongst all its nodes. All the nodes in A are assumed to be united
by a single objective, in favor of the adversary. Hence, the adversary is considered to be a single entity.
2For the ease of reference we refer to nodes that are a part of N , as nodes that are in N .
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3.4 Requisites for a Blockchain Protocol
A blockchain is, in essence, a transaction ledger. For a protocol to implement a robust transaction ledger, it must satisfy
two properties [20]:
• liveness: Once a node broadcasts a transaction, it will eventually be included in the transaction ledger, and be
confirmed.
• persistence: Once an honest node confirms a transaction, then all the other honest nodes, when queried, will
agree with its placement in the ledger.
The authors of [27, 37] showed that liveness and persistence are equivalent to common prefix, chain growth and,
chain quality for any blockchain protocol. For a PoS-based blockchain protocol that utilizes slots, these three properties
are defined as follows in [28].
• Common prefix: We say that the protocol satisfies common prefix property with parameter k , if given the adopted
chains C1 and C2 of any two honest nodes n1 and n2 at slots l1 and l2 respectively such that l1 < l2, then by
removing k blocks from the end of C1 we should get the prefix of C2.
• Chain growth: We say that the protocol satisfies chain growth with parameter ζ , if given the adopted chains C1
andC2 of any an honest node n at slots l1 and l2 respectively such that l1 < l2, then len(C2)−len(C1) ≥ ζ · (l2−l1).
• Chain quality: We say that the protocol satisfies chain quality with parameter υ, if given a consecutive run of l
blocks on a chain C adopted by an honest node, has at least υ · l blocks generated by honest nodes.
Having discussed the preliminary concepts, we now state our assumptions.
3.5 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
• The authors of Ouroboros do not explicitly state the block size or the number of transactions per block. So, for a
fair comparison, we assume that a block of the Ouroboros protocol is similar to that of the Bitcoin protocol and
that of QuickSync in terms of size. That is to say, a block of the Ouroboros protocol, the Bitcoin protocol, and
QuickSync, having the same tpb (typically we assume tpb = 2000), take about the same time to propagate.
• Given the current state of the internet, it is safe to say that a typical block, similar to Bitcoin’s, consisting of 2000
transactions, reaches 95% percent of the nodes in 40 sec. [1, 2] ([17] does not discuss the average block size or
the number of transactions per block). For the ease of analysis, we ignore the 5% tail and say that within 40 sec
all nodes hear of the block, i.e., that 40 sec is our upper bound on propagation, i.e., τ = 40 sec.3
• The block building time is assumed to be negligible compared to τ .
• As is typical in the analysis of blockchain protocols, we assume that honest behavior of the honest nodes is
motivated and ensured by the reward schemes. Here, by honest behavior, we mean that under any circumstance,
the honest nodes follow the prescribed protocol without any deviation.
• In our analysis of tps , for the ease of comparison, we assume that the adversary and all active honest nodes
publish blocks with their block data, at every opportunity they get. In light of this assumption, we can claim that,
tps =
tpb×ζ
tsl
.
With the above background, we explain the construction of our blockchain protocol in the next section.
3We believe τ can be much less than 40 sec as the advent of technology. The lower the τ , better the security (w.r.t. a given tsl ).
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4 QUICKSYNC
First, we introduce our protocol, QuickSync. We then describe QuickSync in detail, starting with the block publisher
selection mechanism (BPSM), which in turn depends upon the chain selection rule (CSR) for QuickSync (Section 4.2).
Then we explain how the block publisher builds and broadcasts the block (Section 4.4). The last step in the protocol is
block confirmation (Section 4.5).
4.1 QuickSync
QuickSync builds on the Ouroboros framework to attain greatly improved performance, while being resistant to a
dynamic byzantine adversary with up to 50% stake. To achieve this, QuickSync, utilizes the novel concept of block power
(P ). Block power is a numerical metric that is defined for every block, can be computed from the block header alone,
and does not depend on the block data. The block power is calculated using the relative stake, r and VRF output, σuro .
The block power utilizes a special function introduced in this paper, to be Sybil resistant. To determine the chain that
must be extended, the nodes use the CSR. The CSR in QuickSync is simply to pick the chain that has the maximum
chain power. The chain power of a chain is calculated by the summation of the block powers of all blocks of that chain.
At the start of each slot, every node publishes a block, extending the chain selected by the CSR. Since all nodes
publish blocks and the block that is to be extended upon is determined by the CSR, the SBP for a slot can be said to be
determined by the CSR in the next slot. Hence, the BPSM depends on the CSR. To ensure that the execution of the
protocol w.r.t. slots is respected, only chains of a certain (for a given slot) length are considered valid. The valid length
of a chain to be extended in the slot, l , is l − 1, i.e., a chain C , must be of length, len(C) = l − 1 to be considered by the
CSR.
For the optimal performance of QuickSync, we scale the relative stake, r , by a constant (parameter defined in the
genesis block), s (s > 0), called the scale factor, to yield stake power α , which is then used to determine the block power.
Please note: We overload the notation, P(·), to denote block power as well chain power; When a block (chain), B1,
has higher block (chain) power than another block (chain), B2, we say that block (chain), B1, is better than block (chain),
B2; We use the notation BlC , to refer to the block, B, that is a part of chain, C , that was published in slot l .
4.2 Block Publisher Selection Mechanism and Chain Selection Rule
We propose the following CSR; to be followed by node, i , in slot, l , to pick a chain, Ccsr , from a set of chains known to
node i at the start of slot l , SChainsview (i,l ), to be extended by publishing a block in slot l :
(1) From the set of chains, SChainsview (i,l ), select a subset of chains S
validChains
view (i,l ) , such that ∀C ∈ SvalidChainsview (i,l ) , len(C) =
l − 1.
(2) Calculate the chain power P(C), of every chain C in SvalidChainsview (i,l ) . The chain with the maximum chain power is
the Ccsr .
(3) Publish a block extending chain Ccsr .
Since 2κ is typically a very large number, the probability that two chains have the same chain power is clearly very
low. In the event that this does happen, the next SBP will extend one of them, all nodes in N will then accept this
extension (This is very similar to the attack wherein the adversary provides two different block data with similar block
headers. Please refer to Section 10).
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4.3 Calculating Block Power and Chain Power
To calculate the chain power, P(C), of a chain, C , sum the block powers, P(B), of all the blocks B ∈ C .
To calculate the block power, P(Bli ), of a block Bli :
(1) Calculate the stake power, αepi , of node i in epoch ep, by multiplying r
ep
i by the scale factor, s .
(2) Normalize σ i,l,seed
ep
uro by dividing it by 2κ , obtaining σ
i,l,seedep
nuro which has a range of [0, 1].
(3) Map the value σ i,l,seed
ep
nuro , from the domain of a uniform pdf with range [0, 1], to the corresponding domain of
the function fα epi (x) = α
ep
i x
α epi −1, using histogram matching.
4.4 Block Publishing
Block publishing comprises of building a block and then broadcasting it. To publish a block in slot, l , a node, i , must
build the block data, Bdli , and the block header, Bh
l
i , as prescribed below. Once the block, B
l
i = {Bhli ,Bdli }, is built, it is
broadcast, completing the process of publishing block, Bli . In QuickSync, to optimize the communication process, only
the best block seen is propagated forward by the nodes instead of their own block.
Block building. Block building is done at the start of the block, after the chain Ccsr has been selected by the CSR as
the one to be extended. At the start of slot l , the node i , collects transactions, {tx0, tx1, . . .}, received by the end of slot
l − 1, that have not yet been added to the blockchain and forms the block data, Bdli = {tx0, tx1, . . .}. The block header
is then built to the format, Bhli = {pki , r
ep
i , l , {hash(Bl−1Ccsr ),null(B
l−1
Ccsr
)}, {σ sk
l
i ,l,seed
ep
uro ,σ
sk li ,l,seed
ep
proof },MTR(Bdli )};
where i is the node with public key, pki , and relative stake, r
ep
i ; l is the slot number; ep is the epoch number;
{σ sk
l
i ,l,seed
ep
uro ,σ
sk li ,l,seed
ep
proof } is generated by VRF (skli , l , seedep ); MTR(Bdli ) is the Merkle tree root of the block data
Bdli , it is what binds the block header to the block data Bd
l
i (also, fixes order of tx in Bd
l
i ); {hash(Bl−1Ccsr ),null(B
l−1
Ccsr
)}
binds block Bli as extending the chain Ccsr beyond block B
l−1
Ccsr
, and denotes whether the block Bl−1Ccsr , was a null block
(Please refer to Section 10).
The block, Bli , is now ready to be broadcast. Note, the block header is sent along with a digital signature over itself
for sender authentication.
Broadcasting the best block. Since all nodes will have valid blocks that are contenders for the best block and can be
selected to be built on in the next slot, waiting to collect all blocks from all users in N will require τ to be very high. So
instead, the nodes only download the block data of the best block header seen yet. Thus, any node will only download
and broadcast the block data of the best block header seen so far. From the perspective of block propagation time, this
method of communication is equivalent to communicating a single valid block. Since the block header is sufficient to
determine the block power of a given block, a node is aware of a block and its power as soon as it receives its block
header. Once a node is aware of a block, it may or may not attempt to download its block data. An honest node should
always try to propagate the best block header it is aware of, to all other nodes, at any given moment.
Consider a network, as shown in Fig. 3. W.L.O.G., let us say that the node n0 is the one that wants to build the next
block and hence needs to know which is the best block in the current slot. The nodes n0,n1,n2,n3,n4,n5 have published
blocks, Bj = {Bhj ,Bdj }; j = {0..5} with P(B1) < P(B2) < P(B3) < P(B4) < P(B5). Say, node n0, sees the blocks in the
following order: B1, B4, B3, B5, B2. Now, first, n0 sees Bh1, and since it is better than Bh0, and hence the best block it is
aware of at the moment, begins to download Bd1. Whether or not n0 has finished downloading Bd1, once it sees Bh4, it
will stop downloading Bd1 and start downloading Bd4. n0, will, however, disregard B3, as it already is aware of a better
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Fig. 3. Block download stack of a node. Fig. 4. The forking attempt by the adversary to violate finality
block, i.e., B4. However, when n0 hears of Bh5, it will switch to downloading Bd5 instead, as its block power is higher.
Again, it will disregard B2, as it is aware of a better block B5.
While broadcasting blocks has been discussed here, the nodes in fact broadcast chains, in essentially the same manner
as discussed above. This broadcasting of chains devolves to broadcasting blocks when the chains differ only by one
block, i.e., the one published in slot l . We omit the discussion on broadcasting chains, i.e., the ones that differ fromCcsr ,
by more than one block for simplicity and tractability. However, it is important to note that the nodes always propagate
the best chain seen so far (similar to the best block propagation as discussed above).
4.5 Block Confirmation
The nodes confirm all, but the most recent k blocks, of the chain selected by the Ccsr . This confirmation is consistent
with k-finality that is attained by QuickSync.
We conclude the presentation of QuickSync with its pseudo-code, given in Fig. 5. The intuition behind QuickSync is
discussed in Section 9. The power of our approach can be summarized as follows: The nodes collectively, as common
knowledge, knowwhich chain to adopt, which then becomes the honest chain. As soon as a fork is witnessed, adversarial
or not, the nodes know whether or not to adopt it, the nodes are not confused, as they would be in protocols that do
not differentiate between published blocks, such as Bitcoin or Ouroboros. However, the adversary can still attempt to
fork and develop chains and use them to violate finality. In the next section, we prove that QuickSync is secure against
such attempts.
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Fig. 5. QuickSync Protocol
QuickSync Protocol Pseudo-code;
Followed by node i in slot l :
INPUT: {skli , r
ep
i , seed
ep , SChainsview (i,l ), s , {tx0, tx1, . . .}}
Step 1: Chain selection
1: From SChainsview (i,l ), select the subset S
validChains
view (i,l ) :
∀C ∈ SvalidChainsview (i,l ) |len(C) = l − 1.
2: ∀C ∈ SvalidChainsview (i,l ) , calculate, P(C).
3: Select the chain,
Ccsr : Ccsr = argmaxC ∈SvalidChainsv iew (i,l ) P(C)
Step 2: Block publishing
a) Block building
1: Build Bdli = {tx0, tx1, . . .}, and obtainMTR(Bdli ).
2: {σ i,l,seedepuro ,σ i,l,seed
ep
proof } ← VRF (skli , l , seedep )
3: Obtain {hash(Bl−1Ccsr ),null(B
l−1
Ccsr
)}
4: BuildBhli = {pki , r
ep
i , l , {hash(Bl−1Ccsr ),null(B
l−1
Ccsr
)},
{σ sk
l
i ,l,seed
ep
uro ,σ
sk li ,l,seed
ep
proof },MTR(Bdli )}
b) Block broadcasting
1: Set Cbroadcast = {Ccsr ,Bli }
2: while Current Slot == l do
3: Listen and receive Cr ec from other nodes
4: if P(Cr ec ) > P(Cbroadcast ) then
5: Set Cbroadcast = Cr ec
6: end if
7: Broadcast Cbroadcast
8: end while
Step 3: Block confirmation
1: for j > 0; j + +; j ≤ len(Ccsr ) − k do
2: Confirm block, B jC .
3: end for
Chain Power P(C)
INPUT: Chain C
OUTPUT: P(C)
1: Sum = 0
2: for l > 0; l + +; l ≤ len(C) do
3: Sum+ = P(BlC )
4: end for
5: P(C) = Sum
Block Power P(BlC )
INPUT: Block BlC
OUTPUT: P(BlC )
1: From the header of block BlC , obtain
pki , r
ep
i ,σuro = σ
sk li ,l,seed
ep
uro , where i is the
publisher of block BlC .
2: From the genesis block obtain s .
3: α
ep
i = r
ep
i × s
4: σnuro =
σuro
2κ
5: P(BlC ) = α
ep
i
√
σnuro
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
To prove the security of QuickSync, w.r.t. liveness and persistence, we need to establish the three prerequisite properties
of a blockchain protocol, i.e., common prefix, chain growth, and chain quality, as given in Section 3.4. We do this
analysis in Section 5.1 and further discuss why QuickSync is resilient to FACs.
QuickSync does not require a Forkable Strings analysis, as presented in v1 and Praos. Due to the elegance and
naturality of our approach, QuickSync avoids the inherent complexities of the Ouroboros protocols. All observed (public)
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forks are immediately and trivially resolved using chain power as the nodes will only build on the chain with the
highest chain power. If an adversarial chain with higher chain power than an honest chain is revealed before it can
violate finality, that adversarial chain becomes the new honest chain. To violate finality (and hence common prefix), an
adversarial chain must have higher chain power than the honest chain while forked for at least k blocks; the probability
of this is exponentially bounded with k , as proved in this section.
5.1 Analysis of Security Requisites
Claim 1. Let X1,X2, . . . ,XM be independent random variables with zero mean, such that |Xl | ≤ K ∀ l ∈ [M],K > 0.
Also, E[Xl 2] ≤ σ 2l . Then, ∀λ > 0:
Σ∞M=kPr
(
1
M
ΣMl=1Xl ≥ λ
)
≤ e
−c ·k
1 − e−c where, c =
λ2
2(σ 2l + Kλ/3)
Proof. Using Bernstein’s inequality [3] for X1,X2, . . . ,XM ,: ∀λ > 0,
Pr
(
1
M
ΣMl=1Xl ≥ λ
)
≤ exp( −Mλ
2/2
σ 2l + Kλ/3
)
=⇒ Σ∞M=kPr
(
1
M
ΣMl=1Xl ≥ λ
)
≤ e
−c ·k
1 − e−c where, c =
λ2
2(σ 2l + Kλ/3)
□
Lemma 1. The probability that QuickSync does not satisfy the common prefix property with parameter k is given by:
εcp ≤ Le
−ck
1 − e−c where, c =
λ2
2(σ 2l + Kλ/3)
Proof. Let E1 be the event when the adversary holds a chain that forks by more than k blocks and has higher chain
power w.r.t. the honest chain, in the lifetime of the protocol. When this event occurs, the adversary can show its chain
to the honest nodes, making them accept it. When the honest nodes accept a chain that forks from their own by more
than k blocks, they are forced to change a confirmed block. This violates finality, and in turn, violates common prefix.
To violate finality, w.r.t. a particular block B′, the adversary must fork the chain at any point before the block B′, say at
block B and then have a better chain after at least k blocks from B. Let EB1 denote the event that finality is violated with
a fork starting at a certain block B.
Now we establish the probability, η = Pr (EB1 ), that the adversary can violate finality with a fork starting at block B.
Since this fork can start at any point in the lifetime of the protocol, we can say that the probability, εcp = Pr (E1), that
common prefix is ever violated is at most L × η, where L is the lifetime of the protocol in slots.
To calculate the upper bound on η, we use Bernstein’s inequality. Using this, we bound the mean of the power of the
blocks from a given block, say B. If at any point, after k blocks from block B, the mean power of the adversarial chain
exceeds that of the honest chain then, we say event EB1 occurs violating finality.
To use Claim 1, we take:
• W lA = αAxαA−1 andW lH = αHxαH−1 to be the random variables, representing the power of the blocks of the
adversary and the honest nodes respectively, in slot l . Here, αA = s × ra and αH = s × rh . Please refer to Fig. 4.
• Xl =WA −WH + (E(WH ) − E(WA)).
• λ = E(WH ) − E(WA) = αHαH+1 −
αA
αA+1 > 0, representing the advantage of honest nodes.
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(a) Finality as a function of s (b) Error probability η as a function of k
Fig. 6. Simulation and Theoretical Analysis
• K = 1 +
(
αH
αH+1 −
αA
αA+1
)
• σ 2l =
(
αA
αA+2 −
(
αA
αA+1
)2)
+
(
αH
αH+2 −
(
αH
αH+1
)2)
Thus:
• E(Xl ) = 0
• |Xl | ≤ 1 + (E(WH ) − E(WA)) = 1 + (αH /(αH + 1) − αA/(αA + 1)) = K
• E[Xl ]2 = σ 2(WA −WH + (E(WH ) − E(WA))) = σ 2(WA) + σ 2(WH ) , since E(Xl ) = 0
=
(
αA
αA + 2
−
(
αA
αA + 1
)2)
+
(
αH
αH + 2
−
(
αH
αH + 1
)2)
Therefore by Claim 1, η ≤ e−ck1−e−c , where, c = λ
2
2(σ 2l +Kλ/3)
Hence, the probability that common prefix is violated is, εcp ≤ Le−ck1−e−c , where, c = λ
2
2(σ 2l +Kλ/3)
Thus common prefix property is established. □
As shown in Fig. 6a the plot of practical tf vs s resembles an elbow curve. That is because as s increases, even though
the difference between the expectation, of the block power of the honest nodes and the block power of the adversary,
decreases, the variance too, decreases. This effect tapers out after s = 8. Thus, we choose s = 8 for the best practical
finality.
Refer to Fig. 6b for the error probability (violation of finality) η as a function of k .
Proposition 1. In QuickSync, a block is added to the chain in each slot, provided ractive > 0.
Proof. In QuickSync, the BPSM depends on the CSR. The CSR used in QuickSync assigns a chain power for each valid
chain and select the one with the highest power, and hence will be able to select a chain as long as there is atleast one
valid chain. To have a valid chain, for the consideration by the CSR, in the current slot, even one block is sufficient to
have been published in the previous slot. Hence, even if there is just one active node in a given slot, there will be a
block added to the chain in that slot.
Lemma 2. QuickSync satisfies the chain growth property with parameter ζ = 1, given that ractive > 0.
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Proof. Let E2 be the event where there is no block added to the chain in a slot, in the lifetime of the protocol. To
satisfy chain growth with parameter ζ = 1, a block must be added to the chain in each slot, i.e., Pr (E2) = 0. For this, the
BPSM must select a node in each slot.
However, by Proposition 1, Pr (E2) = 0 if ractive > 0 for QuickSync. Therefore QuickSync satisfies the chain growth
property with parameter ζ = 1, provided ractive > 0. Thus, the chain growth property is established. □
Lemma 3. The probability that QuickSync does not satisfy the chain quality property with parameter υ = 1/k is εcp .
Proof. Let E3 be the event that there is a run of k or more consecutive blocks, published by the adversary, on the
chain, C , held by an honest node, in the lifetime of the protocol. Let E ′3, be the event where the sum of power of k
consecutive adversarial blocks is higher than the sum of power of the best corresponding honest blocks, in the lifetime
of the protocol. Clearly, E1 subsumes E ′3 (since if E
′
3 occurs; E1 too must occur). Now, for E3 to occur, E
′
3 must occur.
Thus, Pr (E1) ≥ Pr (E3).
Now, evidently, when E3 does not occur, there is at least one honest block in every run of k consecutive blocks.
Hence, when E3 does not occur, υ >= 1/k . Therefore, the probability that chain quality with parameter υ = 1/k is
violated is at most εcp .
Thus, the chain quality property is established. □
Theorem 4. The probability that any of; common prefix with parameter k , chain growth with parameter ζ = 1, chain
quality with parameter υ = 1/k are violated in the lifetime of the protocol, thereby violating liveness and persistence is:
εlp ≤ 2εcp
Proof. The above theorem follows from Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and the union bound Pr (E1 ∪ E3). □
Proposition 2. QuickSync is resilient to fully adaptive corruptions (FACs).
Proof. For a protocol to be resilient to FACs, it must be resilient against attempts of the following two corruptions:
• Posterior corruption: It is the adversary’s ability to corrupt a node, use its stake and hence its block power, to
publish a block in a past slot (w.r.t. the current slot).
• Anterior corruption: It is the adversary’s ability to corrupt a node that might have the best block in the future
(w.r.t. the current slot).
QuickSync avoids posterior corruption by using forward secure key signatures, as in Praos. Although anterior
corruption by itself is not an issue, if the adversary knows which nodes will have the best block with certainty or
disproportionately high probability, then the adversary will corrupt those nodes and gain an advantage over the honest
nodes. To avoid this, the adversary must not know which node will have the best block in the future. To this end, the
nodes that attempt to publish a block must not reveal their block power until they publish the block. This is exactly the
approach in QuickSync. In QuickSync, the block power is given in the block header, and the block header is not revealed
until the block is published. Hence, the block power is not revealed until the block is published.
Thus, we say that QuickSync is resilient to FACs. □
Please refer to Section 10 for the analysis of attack strategies against QuickSync.
6 A COMPARATIVE NOTE ON V1, PRAOS AND ALGORAND
In this section, we compare QuickSync with v1, Praos and Algorand.
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The first version of the Ouroboros protocol v1, the best performing Ouroboros protocol, requires synchrony using
NTP. Additionally, it assumes that the adversary can not corrupt an honest node in the time span of an epoch, which
could last for a few hours or a few days. Thus, it is not secure against FACs, i.e., against a dynamic adversary. This is
due to the fact that all the block publishers of an epoch are common knowledge at the start of the epoch.
The next version of the Ouroboros protocol, Praos, provides security against FACs at a high cost to tf and tps .
Praos achieves liveness and persistence under what the authors refer to as semi-synchronicity (using NTP). However,
in Praos, for security, one must set the parameter f appropriately, which implicitly requires prior knowledge of the
block propagation delay τ . Please refer to Section 8.2 for further details. The later versions of Ouroboros, Genesis and
Crypsinous, do not address the compromise in performance for security against FACs in Praos.
Another popular PoS-based protocol, Algorand [23], is independent of the Ouroboros family of protocols. It too
requires strong synchrony (using NTP) to achieve liveness and final consensus. However, it requires 23 majority of honest
nodes as opposed to 12 as required by QuickSync, Ouroboros, Bitcoin and many others. Due to this strict assumption,
we do not consider Algorand to be in the same league and hence, do not present a comparison. Also, the claims of
tps achieved in the Algorand paper are based on tightly parameterized simulations, whereas QuickSync has been
bench-marked using generous margins on real Bitcoin network data. We believe that, when using the parameters used
by Algorand, QuickSync too can achieve similar tps .
Table 1 gives the value of tf = k · tsl for different values of ra and 1− η. We have used τ = 40 sec for the comparison.
When the adversary has relative stake 10%, it can be easily seen that to have the guarantee of 99.9% on a published
block, QuickSync needs to wait only for 4 minutes where as v1 needs 10 minutes and Bitcoin needs 50 minutes. It can be
seen from Table 1, QuickSync is about 3 times better than v1 and roughly an order of magnitude better than Bitcoin for
the same level of guarantees on finality. In Table 2, we compare the throughput, and it is clear that QuickSync performs
the best in this regard, better than Bitcoin by an order of magnitude.
7 CONCLUSION
PoS-based protocols are attracting attention in the literature, but may potentially be vulnerable to FACs, as in v1.
Addressing FACs may degrade the performance, as in Praos. In this paper, we proposed a novel PoS-based blockchain
protocol, namely, QuickSync. To design it, we introduced a block power metric based on a Sybil attack resistant function
(Eqn 1). We showed that QuickSync satisfies chain prefix, chain growth, and chain quality properties with appropriate
parameters (Theorem 4). We also showed that QuickSync is resistant to FACs (Proposition 2). Our analysis showed
that QuickSync performs better than the Ouroboros protocols (all versions) for tps (transaction per second) and tf
(time to finality; by a factor of 3). We leave it for future work to explore the application of our BPSM and CSR to build
blockchain protocols outside the Ouroboros framework.
We believe the concept of block power and chain power metrics are very useful in designing PoS-based blockchain
protocols. The possible applications of Sybil attack resistant functions in other scenarios involving Sybil attacks need to
be further explored.
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Table 1. Comparison of Time to Finality (in minutes)
BTC: Bitcoin, v1: Ouroboros v1, QS: QuickSync
ra
1 − η 0.95 0.99 0.995 0.999
BTC v1 QS BTC v1 QS BTC v1 QS BTC v1 QS
0.10 30 4 2 40 6 2 40 8 3 50 10 4
0.15 30 5 2 40 10 4 60 11 4 80 16 6
0.20 50 8 3 70 14 5 80 17 6 110 24 8
0.25 60 13 4 100 23 8 120 27 10 150 37 13
0.30 100 22 8 160 38 13 180 46 15 240 63 21
0.35 170 42 14 270 74 24 310 88 28 410 121 38
0.40 360 105 31 580 183 55 670 217 66 890 296 90
0.45 1370 486 127 2200 831 226 2560 980 268 3400 1327 361
0.46 2110 794 203 3400 1347 355 3960 1586 428 5260 2143 584
0.47 3710 1487 362 5970 2506 632 6950 2946 747 8330 3969 1041
0.48 8030 3588 826 - 5991 1434 - 7028 1680 - 9438 2335
Table 2. Comparison of tps
tps
Bitcoin tpbavд .t imeperblock (sec) =
2000
600 = 3.3
Ouroboros v1 tpb×r
act ive
tsl
=⇒ tps < 50 ∀ ractive < 1
QuickSync tpbtsl = 50 ∀ ractive > 0
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8 APPENDIX
8.1 Notation Table
Table 3. Notation
Notation Description Notation Description
BPSM Block Publisher Selection Mechanism CSR Chain Selection Rule
SBP Selected Block Publisher PoW, PoS Proof-of-Work, Proof-of-Stake
v1, Praos Ouroboros v1, Ouroboros Praos FAC Fully Adaptive Corruption
tps transactions per second tf time to finality
pki ,mski public key, master secret key of node i tpb transactions per block
len(C) length of chain C excluding genesis block rh , ra relative stake of honest nodes, adversary
NTP Network Time Protocol tsl length of a slot
BepPG Pseudo-genesis block of epoch ep sk
l
i secret key of node i for slot l
seedep random seed used in epoch ep r epi relative stake of node i considered in epoch
ep
VRF Verifiable Random Function σuro, σproof uniform random output of the VRF, its proof
κ length of σuro η probability of finality violation with fork
starting from a given point
τ block propagation delay P (B), P (C) power of block B , chain C
s scale factor α stake power; α = r × s ;
BlC block B , part of chain C , published in slot l Ccsr chain selected by CSR; adopted/held by the
node
Bli block B , published in slot l by node i Bh
l
i , Bd
l
i block header, data of block B
l
i
SChainsv iew (i,l ) set of chains known to node i at the start of
slot l
SvalidChainsv iew (i,l ) chains of valid length in S
Chains
v iew (i,l )
MTR Merkle Tree Root ract ive fraction of active relative stake
L lifetime of the protocol in slots k common prefix parameter
8.2 A Brief Introduction to the Ouroboros Protocols
This section describes, in brief, the various concepts used from the Ouroboros protocol. For a detailed formulation,
please refer to the Ouroboros protocol papers.
In addition to the framework mentioned in 8.2, both, v1 and Praos; have designated slot leader(s) (SPB), in each
slot, that are allowed to publish blocks in that slot; always extend the longest chain as long as it does not differ from
the chain they currently hold by more than k blocks; use moving checkpoints to provide security against long-range
attacks, such as stake-bleeding attacks.
For a protocol that operates in time slots of length tsl (tsl > 0), we require another variable to represent the block
propagation time in units of slots which we denote by ∆ = ⌈ τtsl ⌉ − 1. Thus, ∆ is the number of slots a block needs,
excluding the slot it was generated in, to reach all the nodes. For example, if τ = 60sec, and tsl = 20 sec, we say that
∆ = 2 slot. Note that in QuickSync, since tsl is always set to be τ , ∆ is always 0, and hence, the concept of ∆ is not
crucial.
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v1. v1 has the following salient points:
• Synchronous model with tsl = τ , i.e., each slot is long enough for all messages to reach their destination by the
end of the slot.
• Each slot has exactly one leader, either honest or adversarial (stochastically given by the ratio of honest to
adversarial relative stake), chosen using the epoch randomness, slot counter, and the stake distribution given in
the current epoch’s pseudo-genesis block. These slot leaders (identified by their public keys) are public knowledge
at the start of the current epoch.
v1 is not immune to FACs for the following two reasons. (i) As the selected block publishers of future blocks are
known well in advance, the attacker may corrupt these publishers. This increases the effectiveness of attacks, such as
DDoS, to a point where the protocol is unusable. (ii) The honest nodes that have published a block (in some slot) may
be corrupted by the adversary later, to re-publish another block (in the same slot) in favor of the adversary.
Praos. Praos has the following salient points:
• Semi-synchronous with synchronized clocks (any margin on clock synchronization is considered to be insignifi-
cant compared to the slot length).
• Multiple or no block publishers can be selected for each slot, with f as the active slot co-efficient.
• Each node must pass randomness with the current slot number to the VRF and check if the resultant output is
less than a certain value, which is proportional to the stake held by the node. If yes, it is a slot leader for this slot.
Only the slot leaders know that they are the slot leaders until they publish a block.
• Uses forward secure key signatures.
The intuition in Praos is similar to the one in the Bitcoin Backbone Protocol [20]. In the paper, the execution of the
protocol is divided into time slots (referred to as rounds in the paper), and it is made sure that the probability of finding
a block is low enough such that only one block is found per slot. In the bounded-delay case, the probability of finding a
block is so low that only one block is found in as many rounds as it takes for synchronization. The probability of these
uniquely honest rounds is hedged by the advantage of honest nodes, against the probability of finding multiple honest
blocks or adversarial blocks.
Similarly, the idea here is to setup probabilities such that there are sufficient uniquely honest slots and empty slots.
This allows any forks created during the contested slots to settle. These forks are settled, given that there is a sufficient
number of empty slots to allow honest nodes to synchronize. This would enable honest nodes to extend the longest
chain and not extend forks. To avoid forkable scenarios over some sufficiently long characteristic string, a sufficient
probability of uniquely honest and empty slots is provided so that the adversary cannot maintain forks over this
characteristic string.
Praos avoids the security flaw in v1, i.e., non-resilience to FACs. However, as our analysis shows, it does so at a high
cost to the tps and tf . The authors of this paper also claim that another advantage of Praos is its ability to operate in a
semi-synchronous model, using NTP for time slot synchronization. However, the benefit of using the semi-synchronous
model in Praos from the standpoint of effective participation, as compared to the synchronous model in v1, is not
discussed. It is unclear at the time of writing this paper that there is any such benefit, as setting the parameters in Praos
involves making estimates and assumptions, that are similar to the ones that are required to be made, while setting the
parameters in v1. This is because, given rh , the parameter f of Praos, must be set on the basis of ∆ (which depends on τ
and tsl ), to satisfy rh (1 − f )∆+1 ≥ 1/2. This is similar to making an estimation on τ , given rh , in v1 (and QuickSync). If
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the actual delay is greater than the estimated delay, or if temporal desynchronization arises between nodes, the effective
participation of honest nodes deteriorates, leading to a violation of the requirements for achieving security.
Note that, tsl and f are parameters set beforehand, and are typically taken to be a safe number. Once set, they do not
need to be changed, as the internet will only get better and better. This is in contrast to mining difficulty in Bitcoin,
which needs to be changed repeatedly, as the hash power in the system keeps fluctuating, and it is imperative for the
functioning of the Bitcoin protocol that this be set appropriately at all times.
Genesis and Crypsinous. Ouroboros Genesis and Crypsinous both add features to the protocol. Ouroboros Genesis,
which builds on Praos, eliminates the need for moving checkpoints using chain density statistics. Moving checkpoints are
required in similar PoS protocols, including Praos and v1, to prevent long-range attacks such as stake-bleeding attacks
[21]. Genesis also provides a Global Universal Composable formulation [12]. Ouroboros Crypsinous builds on Genesis,
and provides privacy-preservation using Zerocash [38].
8.3 Analysis of The Ouroboros Protocol
In this section, we present the theoretical performance analysis of the Ouroboros protocols, v1 and Praos.
Analysis of tps. The limit on transactions per second (tps), is what determines the scalability of a protocol. It is determined
by the block size and the rate at which blocks are added to the blockchain, which, in turn, is determined by the upper
bound on propagation delay and other factors specific to the protocol.
v1. In v1, a block is published in each slot, if all nodes are active. If a node is elected to be a slot leader and is not
active at this point in time, then it loses its chance to publish, and the slot goes empty. Therefore, if only a fraction,
ractive , of the relative stake is active, then tps = tpb×r
act ive
tsl
.
Now, in practice ractive < 1, therefore tps < tpbtsl =
2000
40 = 50
Ouroboros Praos. The proofs for common prefix, chain growth and chain quality, given in the Ouroboros Praos
protocol paper, require the following condition to be satisfied:
rh (1 − f )∆+1 ≥ 1/2
where rh is the relative stake of the honest nodes, f is the active slot co-efficient (fraction of slots that are expected to
generate blocks, provided all nodes participate), and ∆ is the upper bound on the propagation delay in units of slots, as
discussed above. Now, the parameter f is set after determining the parameters rh and ∆, i.e., we first decide against
how powerful an adversary we would like to be secure against and under what delay. We are now in a position to
discuss the limitations of the Ouroboros Praos protocol in terms of scalability (limit on tps). The generalized expression
for the limit tps of the Ouroboros Praos protocol is:
tps =
tpb
τ
(∆ + 1)f = tpb
τ
(∆ + 1)(1 − (2rh )−1/(∆+1))
In Table 4, we describe the maximum tps achieved by Praos for a given ∆ assuming some rh .
We observe that under realistic conditions, the Ouroboros Praos protocol is limited to tps that is not much higher
than Bitcoin’s, which is around 3.5.
Our protocol, QuickSync, presented in this paper, achieves a tps of 50, for any value of ractive > 0.
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Table 4. Maximum tps of Ouroboros Praos
rh 0.55 0.6 0.8 1 0.6 0.6 1 1 1 0.6 0.55
∆ 0 0 0 0 1 9 1 9 ∞ ∞ ∞
tps 4.54 8.33 18.75 25 8.71 9.03 8.71 33.4 35 9.2 5
Analysis of Finality. Finality, with parameter k , refers to the property of a blockchain that, all honest nodes can confirm
a block B, once k blocks have extended the chain of block B after block B. The confirmation of a block by an honest
node implies the confidence that no other honest node will ever in the future disagree with the confirmed block’s
placement in the ledger, with probability 1 − η.
When we say that the finality property is violated, w.r.t., block B, we mean that once an honest node has confirmed
B, some honest node disagrees with block B’s placement in the ledger (after confirmation of the block B). For this to
happen, the common prefix property must be violated, forking the chain before block B.
In Bitcoin, this parameter k , is set to be 6, for η = 0.001. This means that, given a block generation rate of 1 block per
10 minutes, it takes 60 minutes on an average to confirm a block, with an assurance level of 0.999 against an adversary
with ra = 0.1, once it has been published.
Please note that the block assurance level translates to the transaction assurance level from the blockchain user’s
perspective. The finality parameter of a blockchain is very crucial to its acceptance and adoption by its users. This is
because the finality parameter, the block generation rate, and the slot length tsl , are what determine how long the users
will have to wait before their transaction is confirmed. Mathematically, the average wait time, in units of time, for the
confirmation of a block is, k .tsl /f , where f is the block generation rate.
v1. In v1, the probability that the common prefix property with parameter k is violated, is given by:
ϵCP (k) ≜ L. exp(−ϵ
3 .(1−O (ϵ )).k/2)
1−exp(−ϵ 3/2) where, ϵ = rh − ra , and the probability that finality is violated is w.r.t. a given block
is: η(k) ≜ exp(−ϵ 3 .(1−O (ϵ )).k/2)1−exp(−ϵ 3/2)
Now, for a required block assurance level η = 0.001 ≈ e−7 with rh = 0.55 =⇒ ϵ = 0.1, consider the k required: (we
ignore O(ϵ), in favour of the protocol)
ln
(
1
1 − exp(−ϵ3/2)
)
− ϵ3.k/2 = −7 =⇒ k = 2 × 14.6/ϵ3 = 2000 × 14.6 = 29202
Therefore, theoretically, it takes (at most) 29202 blocks, i.e., approx 19468 minutes (given τ = tsl = 40 sec) to confirm,
with assurance level of 0.999, given this scenario. In comparison, Bitcoin takes approx 3400 minutes for a similar
confirmation.
Ouroboros Praos. In Ouroboros Praos, the probability that the common prefix property with parameter k , is violated,
is no more than: ϵCP (k) ≜ 19Lϵ 4 e(∆−ϵ
4k/18) for given ϵ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying, rh (1 − f )∆+1 ≥ 1+ϵ2 where, k is the common
prefix parameter, ∆ is the delay in units of slots, rh is the relative stake of honest nodes, f is the active slot co-efficient
(blocks generated per slot), and L is the lifetime of the protocol in units of slots. The probability that finality is violated
w.r.t. a block B is, η(k) ≜ 19ϵ 4 e(∆−ϵ
4k/18) for given ϵ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying, rh (1 − f )∆+1 ≥ 1+ϵ2 So, given a required block
assurance level η, the average wait time, in units of time, for the confirmation of a block in the Ouroboros Praos protocol
is k .tsl /f , where f is the active slot co-efficient (blocks generated per slot), and k is given by, η = 19ϵ 4 e(∆−ϵ
4k/18) where,
ϵ is given by rh .(1 − f )∆+1 = (1 + ϵ)/2 , i.e., k = 18ϵ 4 (∆ − ln
ηϵ 4
19 ) where, ϵ = 2rh (1 − f )∆+1 − 1. Therefore, the average
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wait time, in units of time, for the confirmation of a block in the Ouroboros Praos protocol is, tf =
18.tsl
ϵ 4f (∆ − ln
ηϵ 4
19 )
where, ϵ = 2rh (1 − f )∆+1 − 1 and ∆ = ⌈ τtsl ⌉ − 1.
Let’s take an example setting, rh = 0.7, τ = 40 sec, tsl = 20 sec, f = 1/11, η = 0.01, ∆ = 1, ϵ4 = .0006, then,
tf = 1732081 mins. For a more favourable setting of, f = 1/19,∆ = 0 (remaining parameters same), tf = 241890
mins. To compare it to v1 with, rh = 0.55, τ = 40 sec, η = 0.001, we use, for optimality, f = 1/57, ∆ = 0, yielding,
tf = 321230909 mins.
It is evident that the above expressions result in absurdly high values for typical (even favorable) settings. This means
that the user, theoretically, waits a very long time before their transactions are confirmed. We show that QuickSync
attains finality much quicker, theoretically, and practically.
9 THE INTUITION BEHIND QUICKSYNC
We require that our protocol, QuickSync, satisfies the following two requirements:
• To ensure security against FACs, the SBP must not be revealed before it publishes the block.
• Forks costs performance. Hence, forking amongst the honest nodes must be avoided. Thus, at any time, ideally,
we must have only one block that should be extended.
To fulfill the first requirement, the computation required by the BPSM must be done privately. For the second
requirement, the BPSM must select exactly one block publisher as the SBP. Satisfying both of these requirements
together is non-trivial, as we must privately, securely, provably and efficiently select exactly one party in a multiparty
weighted coin-toss with guaranteed output using a seed-randomness (which is easy to generate using PVSS or SCRAPE
as mentioned earlier). The BPSM presented in this paper solves for both these requirements through the CSR. In contrast,
v1 solves only the second requirement but not the first, while Praos solves only the first requirement but not the second.
Each node publishes its block, in an attempt to have it selected as the next block to be added to the blockchain.
However, if the nodes arbitrarily choose one of the blocks they received, they might select different blocks, hence
causing forks. Suppose, if, from a given set of options, all the nodes know which block to extend. If this is the case, then all
the nodes would extend the same block, and hence avoid forks. Now since all the nodes will publish their own blocks,
and only one must be selected amongst them, in such a way that all arrive at the same result, we establish a metric
called block power, by which all the nodes must evaluate the competing blocks. The block (chain) with the maximum
block (chain) power is selected. This metric must, of course, be dependent on the stake of the block publisher so that
our protocol can be PoS-based.
Naive implementations of the above approach are vulnerable to Sybil attacks. To solve for this, we present a Sybil
attack resistant function:
fα (x) = αxα−1 (1)
where x represents the block power, α is the stake power of the block publisher, and the resulting fα (x) is the
probability distribution function (pdf ) of the block power of the block.
To be Sybil resistant, we must ensure that whether a node is represented as a single entity of stake α or two entities
of stake power α1 and α2, the pdf of the node’s effective block power (the node’s maximum block power, as one or
more entities) remains the same. Hence, the node has the same probability of becoming the SBP, regardless of division
into smaller nodes or aggregation into bigger ones.
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The function in Eqn. 1 is resilient to Sybil attacks due to the following property:
fα (x) = fα1 (x)
∫ x
0
fα2 (y)dy + fα2 (x)
∫ x
0
fα1 (y)dy
where α = α1 + α2 ∀ α1,α2 > 0, the attacker splitting its computing power into two entities.
To utilize fα (x), we map the uniformly distributed normalized output over [0, 1], σnuro , of the private computation
required by the BPSM to the domain of fα (x), using histogram matching, where α is the stake power of the block
publisher. The re-mapped domain is then used as the block power.
To show why and how our block power approach is powerful, we use an example. Consider a fork, where nodes, na
and nb , both are aware of two blocks, B1 and B2 viable for extension. Now, in both Ouroboros and Bitcoin, there is no
distinction made between the two blocks. Hence, the node, na , may extend block B1, while node, nb , extends block B2.
This causes an extension of the fork. This is what QuickSync gracefully avoids. The same scenario in QuickSync would
lead to both nodes extending either block B1 or block B2, depending on their block powers. This collective decision to
select one block that is to be extended, resolves the fork. Since the forks are immediately resolved, it is equivalent to the
forks never occurring. This results in avoiding forking amongst honest nodes and is why the block power approach is
so powerful.
10 ANALYSIS OF ATTACK STRATEGIES AGAINST QUICKSYNC
In this section, we discuss possible attack strategies and show that they are futile against QuickSync.
Sybil attack. Consider two scenarios: i) in which there is a node with stake power α0 and ii) there are two nodes
with stake power α1 and α2. In the first scenario, there will be one value of block power in consideration, whereas, in
the second scenario, there are two values. However, in the second scenario, only the higher block power is relevant as
the CSR will (and hence the BPSM) select the block with the maximum block power. To avoid Sybil attack, we need that
in both the scenarios, the pdf of the relevant block power to be the same, else the adversary has an incentive to split or
aggregate stake power to have a higher probability of getting selected as SBP. To this end we must ensure that the pdf
of the block power in the first scenario must equivalent to the pdf of the maximum of the two block powers in the
second scenario, i.e., we need a block power function that satisfies:
fα0 (x) = fα1 (x)
∫ x
0
fα2 (y)dy + fα2 (x)
∫ x
0
fα1 (y)dy
where α0 = α1 + α2 ∀ α1,α2 > 0, which is satisfied by fα (x) = αxα−1.
Also the probability that a node, with stake α1, wins over a node, with stake α2, is:∫ 1
0
fα1 (x)
∫ x
0
fα2 (y)dydx =
α1
α1 + α2
Double spending attack. In this sort of an attack, the adversary attempts to replace a certain block B′ on the chain of
an honest node after it has confirmed the block B′. To do this, the adversary must show a better chain that forks by at
least k blocks, starting from before block B′, to an honest node that has confirmed block B′. This attack is ineffective,
given that the common prefix property is established. However, the adversary can attempt to reduce the effectiveness
of the stake power of N or increase the effectiveness of its own stake power. It can attempt to do so in the following
two ways, neither of which are effective:
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• Split N attack: Ideally, all the nodes in N choose the same chain and attempt to build on top of it. In this case, the
stake power of the honest nodes is undivided. However, even if the adversary attempts to divide N , it is easy to
see that the protocol will not be compromised. The adversary can try to split N by:
– Showing different chains to different subsets of N . Say, there is a chainC , that was built by N and sent to all in
N . The adversary will have to show a node, say n1, in N , a chain better thanC , sayC1. Now either the node n1
finds the block that leads to its chain being the best chain or some other node does. If n1 finds it extending C1,
it will broadcast the chain since it is an honest node. If any node other than n1 finds it, the protocol executes
as usual. So, even if the adversary tries to show a different chain to some node in N , N will not be worse off.
– Giving different block data with the same block header to different subsets of N . This case is a trivial subset of
the above case. In fact, this can also happen in Ouroboros. If the adversary does try to give two blocks, with
the same block header, but with different block data, the node which finds the next block that leads to its chain
being the best chain, will extend the version it has, and all will then accept this.
• Borrow power attack: Consider the following case, starting from a common block B. N sees the block B1H as the
best block extending B. A node n in N , is shown a better block B1A by the adversary. Now, say, n makes block B
2
n
extending B1A, rest of N makes block B
2
H extending B
1
H , and the adversary makes block B
2
A extending B
1
A; and if,
P(B2n ) > P(B2A) and P(B1A) + P(B2n ) < P(B1H ) + P(B2H ); then N will use {B1H ,B2H }, but now the adversary also has
{B1A,B2n } which is better than it’s own {B1A,B2A}. So in a sense the adversary has borrowed n’s power. We use
simulations to show that this attack does not significantly affect the adversary’s ability to violate common prefix.
For details, please refer to Section 10.1.
Missing block data attack. Since the nodes are required to build on the chain with the maximum power. The adversary
(or any node not in N ), when it has the best chain, could show its block header to nodes in N , and then not send the
block data. This would result in the nodes in N being unable to proceed with the protocol execution and hence would
stall the protocol. All honest nodes, however, will always broadcast the best block header (that they are aware of) along
with its block data, and will always include the block data of the previous block when extending it.
To avoid this scenario, we allow nodes to extend blocks without their block data. We call such a block, that has only
the block header and no block data, as a null block. This approach would keep the protocol from stalling as well as
prevent the honest chain from losing power (as we can use null blocks when calculating chain power). The information
that the previous block was a null block or not is given in the header of the block extending it. Since this information is
immutable, given a chain, each block can be unambiguously determined to be null or not. Note that null blocks are
different from blocks that have 0 transactions in their block data.
We believe the effect of this attack can be easily mitigated through reward schemes. E.g., by reducing the utility
(block reward and transaction fees) of both the owner (publisher) of the null block as well as of the node extending it.
As the cost of publishing null blocks is discouraging, the adversary will not launch this attack. The optimal method that
can be used to deal with this scenario is dependent on the specifics of the implementation. We, however, assume that
this affects neither tps nor chain growth.
10.1 Borrow Power Attack
Let us calculate the impact of the borrow power attack. Each time the adversarial chain is better than or equal to the
honest chain, the adversary can show this chain to a fraction of the honest nodes in N , and have them build on it in
that slot. When the adversary shows its chain, it may gain or lose utility, depending on the stochastic outcome. Before
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Fig. 7. Graphical representation of power of blocks in the borrow power attack
the adversary shows its chain, it knows the value of power by which it beats the honest chain, as well as the power of
its block in that slot. Using this information, the adversary calculates the optimum fraction of nodes to show its chain
to. Here, we show that even though the expected utility is positive for the adversary, the gain is, in fact, negligible and
marginally affects the adversary’s ability to violate common prefix.
Let us consider the power of the chain of the honest nodes, up till the given slot, to be the baseline. Let us say that
the adversarial chain has t more power than that of the honest nodes. Let v be the power of the adversarial block in
this slot. We spilt stake power of H as c + a where c is the fraction of stake power of the nodes in H that build on
the chain that the adversary shows to them (adversarial chain) and a is the fraction of stake power of the remaining
nodes in H which build on the chain built by the honest nodes. Here, we overload the notation c,a to also represent
the corresponding sets of nodes, respectively. Let u,w denote the block powers of the blocks generated by a and c
respectively, and hence u andw are random variables with pdfs aua−1 and cwc−1 respectively. Here, we ignore the case
v + t >= 1, as in that case, the adversary can never expect to gain anything and hence will never play that scenario
out. Please refer to Fig. 7 for graphical representation. Note that all these variables have the constraints: 0 < v < 1,
0 < t < 1, 0 < u < 1, 0 < w < 1, a > 0, c > 0, v + t < 1, a + c = αh .
Now, as mentioned above, the exact utility of the adversary depends on the power generated by a and c . The
adversary selects the c that gives the optimal expected utility. The utility here refers to the gain in chain power that the
adversary obtains when it conducts the attacks in the given slot. The change in the difference in chain power of N and
the adversary is realized by adopting (or being forced to adopt a different chain than the one held before the attack).
Whenever c develops a chain that is better than a’s, N adopts it. Since the adversary needs to maintain a chain that
differs from the honest chain by at least k blocks, from the one N holds, the adversary can no longer build on the chain
that c has developed or the one that it showed to c (unless the adversary wants to start the fork from another point).
However, the adversary can now use the chain N has discarded, and it will do so if profitable.
We use the following assumptions:
- We assume that the adversary is comprised of several small nodes. This assumption implies that the adversary has
several chains close to the power of its best chain, and when N adopts its chain, it does lose any chain power. This
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(a) Optimal expected gain given v , t , ra =
0.45
(b) Expected gain given c , v , ra = 0.45,
t = 0
(c) Effectiveness of the borrow power attack
Fig. 8. Borrow Power Attack – Simulation Analysis
means that whenever c makes a chain better than the one of a, and the honest nodes adopts c’s chain (the one built on
the adversary’s best chain before the attack), thus rendering c’s chain useless for the adversary (for the current forking
attempt), the adversary itself does not lose any chain power.
- For simplicity, we assume that all the stake power in N is held by just one node. That is, there is only one block
published by N in any slot. However, in the first slot of the forking attempt, we ignore this assumption. Instead, we
assume that N is comprised of several small nodes, in favor of the adversary. The adversary can choose between any
of the blocks it has built and any block the honest nodes have published except the best block of N . Due to this, the
adversary, in the first slot of the forking attempt, always has a better or an equivalent block as compared to N .
We consider the following six cases. For each of these cases, we now determine the gain in chain power, i.e., the
utility gained by the adversary on N when it launches borrow power attack. Note that this gain is as compared to the
case where the adversary does not launch such an attack. The utility gained by N is utility lost by the adversary.
• Case 1: v + t > w + t > u
Ifw > u, then N gains utility t . If u ≥ w , then N gains utility (w + t − u).
N ’s expected gain: c1h =
∫ v
0 cw
c−1 (∫ w
0 tau
a−1 du +
∫ w+t
w (w + t − u)aua−1 du
)
dw
• Case 2: v + t > u > w + t ; No one gets any utility.
• Case 3: u > v + t > w + t ; No one gets any utility.
• Case 4:w + t > v + t > u
Ifw > u, then N gains utility t . If u ≥ w , then N gains utility (w + t − u).
N ’s expected gain: c4h =
∫ v+t
v au
a−1 (∫ 1
u tcw
c−1 dw +
∫ u
v (w + t − u) cwc−1 dw
)
du
• Case 5:w + t > u > v + t
Ifw > u, then N gains utility t . If u ≥ w , then N gains utility (w + t − u).
Adversary gains utility (u − (v + t))
Adversary’s expected gain: c5a
=
∫ 1−t
v
cwc−1
(∫ w+t
v+t
(u − v − t )aua−1 du
)
dw +
∫ 1
1−t
cwc−1
(∫ 1
v+t
(u − v − t )aua−1 du
)
dw
N ’s expected gain: c5h =
∫ 1
v+t au
a−1 (∫ u
u−t (w + t − u) cwc−1 dw +
∫ 1
u tcw
c−1 dw
)
du
• Case 6: u > w + t > v + t
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Adversary gains utilityw −v .
Adversary’s expected gain: c6a =
∫ 1−t
v cw
c−1 (∫ 1
w+t (w − v)aua−1 du
)
dw
So the expected gain of the adversary is, feaд(a, c,v, t) = (c5a + c6a ) − (c1h + c4h + c5h )
Now, to calculate the optimal c , the adversary will do the following:
(1) Substitute a = αh − c in feaд .
(2) Now, find the c(v, t) that maximizes feaд(c,v, t).
(3) Substitute v and t , in c(v, t), to get the optimal value of c .
Refer to Fig. 8a, to see how the maximum (over c) expected value of feaд changes with v and t , and 8b, to see how
the value of feaд changes with c and v , when t = 0.
As we see in Fig. 8c the borrow power attack does not significantly affect the adversary’s power to violate finality.
11 DISCUSSION ON QUICKSYNC PARAMETERS
In this section, we discuss how to set the three parameters relevant to the protocol QuickSync. Two parameters are
endogenous to the protocol, namely, s and tsl . s is the factor by which the relative stake of a node is scaled to assign it
the stake power. In QuickSync, s affects the tf significantly and hence should be chosen to be optimal. We recommend
using s = 8. As we see from Fig. 6a any s > 4 should suffice. tsl is the time slot length in units of time. tsl greatly
impacts transaction per second (tps), time to finality (tf ), and relative stake of the honest nodes (rh ). Ideally, tsl must be
set equal to τ or at least τ . τ is upper bound on the block propagation delay. It depends upon the network and must be
estimated. Decreasing tsl , increases tps and reduces tf which is very favourable. However, this comes at the risk of
reducing it below the actual value of τ , causing rh to drop below half, compromising the security of the protocol. Given
the current state of the internet we suggest tsl = τ = 40 sec (from [1, 17]). Once we set tsl , it need not be changed as
internet connectivity will only get better.
Another crucial parameter is k , which is exogenous to the protocol. It is an important factor from the perspective
of the consumer of the blockchain. k is the number of blocks that a node should wait to confirm a block for a given
confidence level 1 − η against an adversary with relative stake ra . As the block gets deeper into the blockchain, the
confidence of the block’s placement in the ledger increases.
